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Constitutional Law-COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE: ORDINANCE PROHIB-
ITING NEWSPAPER FROM PRINTING SEX-DESIGNATED EMPLOYMENT ADVERTIS-
ING HELD CONSTITUTONAL-Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission
on Human Relations, 93 S. Ct. 2553 (1973).
Newspapers generally provide sex-designated sections for help wanted
advertisements, and only in recent years has the law focused its attention
upon the practice.' Federal law2 prohibits the use of these designated sec-
tions where sex is not a bona fide occupational qualification. While the
courts have upheld the civil prosecution of employers under this law,3 they
have found newspapers to be specifically exempt from its application,4 a
conclusion supported by legislative history.5
Congressional exemption of newspapers from the operation of the stat-
ute6 seems to stem not from a fear of infringement upon the freedom of
press, but from a desire to avoid burdening newspaper publishers with the
onerous task of checking each sex-designated advertisement to assure that
it is in fact based upon a bona fide occupational qualification.' At least one
court has held that newspapers may be prohibited from publishing dis-
criminatory advertisements without violating the first amendment8 on the
basis that purely commercial speech is unprotected by the first amend-
ment.'
In view of this state of the law, it came as no great surprise when, in the
recent decision of Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on
Human Relations,'0 the United States Supreme Court again upheld the
legislative power to oversee the content of advertising which a newspaper
1. See generally 3 MEMPHIS ST. U.L. REV. 355 (1973); 52 B.U.L. REV. 896 (1972).
2. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(b) (Supp. 1973).
3. Hailes v. United Air Lines, 464 F.2d 1006 (5th Cir. 1972).
4. Brush v. San Francisco Newspaper Printing Co., 315 F. Supp. 577 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
5. Civil Rights Act of 1964, H.R. REP. No. 914, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2403 (1964).
6. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(b) (Supp. 1973).
7. Civil Rights Act of 1964, supra note 5.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. I:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.
9. United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1972) (classified rental advertisement
expressing racial preference was not protected because it was purely commercial speech). The
denial of first amendment protection to advertising because it is "commercial speech" is
nothing new. See, e.g., Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (upholding FCC
requirements that broadcasters give time for advertisements against cigarette smoking); Bi-
gelow v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 191, 191 S.E.2d 173 (1972) (upholding a statute prohibiting
advertisement of abortion referral services).
10. 93 S. Ct. 2553 (1973).
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may print. The Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations had held that
appellant Pittsburgh Press Company had violated a city ordinance', by
providing sex-designated sections in its newspaper for help wanted adver-
tisements. 2 The Commission's findings ultimately resulted in a cease and
desist order against further use of the advertising system except when
permitted by the ordinance."3
Pittsburgh Press Company argued that the Commission's application of
the ordinance was an unconstitutional violation of its right to freedom of
press. Further, the appellant asserted that even if the advertisers and their
employment advertisements were not protected, the ordinance was a first
amendment violation of its editorial judgment as to the location and ar-
rangement of its classified advertisements.
The Court, rejecting these arguments, found the employment advertise-
ments to be "commercial speech" and as such, unprotected by the first
amendment. The Court further held that the use of the sex-designated
headings was not severable from the unprotected commercial advertise-
ments, nor did the fact that the first amendment challenge was launched
by the newspaper publisher rather than the advertisers hinder the applica-
tion of the commercial speech doctrine." The Court side-stepped a request
that the commercial speech doctrine be abrogated by pointing to the illegal
activity being furthered by these commercial advertisements-discrimi-
natory employment practices.
The Court acknowledged that the mere fact that language was in the
form of a paid advertisement or that it was directed toward profit would
not render the speech commercial. 6 Realizing that there would be instan-
11. Human Relations Ordinance, Pittsburgh, Pa., Ordinance 75, Feb. 27, 1967, as amended
Pittsburgh, Pa., Ordinance 375, July 8, 1969 (adding sex to its protected classes).
12. Id. § 8(e) makes it unlawful "[flor any employer ... to cause to be published...
any . . . [employment] advertisement ... which indicates any discrimination because of
... sex," while § 8(j) which Pittsburgh Press Co. was found to have violated, makes it illegal
"for any person ... to aid ... in the doing of any act declared to be an unlawful employ-
ment practice by this ordinance. . ... "
13. Initially the Commission's order prohibited all sex-designated advertising, but was
modified by Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 4 Pa. Commw.
448, 287 A.2d 161 (1972) to allow use of the system for jobs exempt from the working of the
ordinance, e.g., employers outside the city of Pittsburgh or those jobs where sex is a "bona
fide occupational qualification (B.F.O.Q.)."
14. An amicus curiae brief suggested the order be condemned as a prior restraint in the
English common law sense of the term, but the Court rejected this contention because the
injunction was based upon a "continuing course of repetitive conduct." 93 S. Ct. at 2561.
15. The Court summarily dismissed a contention that the ordinance violated "due process
in that there is no rational connection between sex-designated column headings and sex
discrimination in employment." Id. n.7 at 2556.
16. As substantiation for this conclusion the Court cited New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
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ces where paid advertisements would be absolutely protected, the Court
held that these employment advertisements were commercial 7 because
they "did no more than propose a commercial transaction."' 8
The commercial speech doctrine19 has not enjoyed widespread approval.
It has been branded as an "anomaly"2 by some, while others have openly
referred to the doctrine as wrong. 2' The chief objection of most observers
is that the stark exclusion of all purely commercial speech from protection
was announced "without any reliance on either the language or the theory
of the first amendment" [emphasis added]. 22
Is the commercial speech doctrine and its application to cases like
376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that a political advertisement was protected by the first amend-
ment from giving rise to a libel action). 93 S. Ct. at 2558.
17. 93 S. Ct. at 2559.
18. Id. at 2558.
19. The origin of the doctrine can be traced to the two cases of Valentine v. Chrestensen,
316 U.S. 52 (1942) and Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951). Few commentators seem
to have seen a broad application of the doctrine beyond the two types of media involved in
these cases: Valentine dealt with the distribution of handbills, while Breard dealt with door
to door solicitation. See, e.g., Resnik, Freedom of Speech and Commercial Solicitaton, 30
CALIF. L. REV. 655 (1942); 2 BILL OF RIGHTS REV. 222 (1942); 26 MINN. L. REV. 895 (1942). Even
in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 93 S. Ct. 2553, 2562, 2566
(1973) (Burger, C.J. & Stewart, J., dissenting in separate opinions) it is argued that Valentine
applies only to its subject media (handbills). Even today Valentine is seem by some commen-
tators as significant only within its limited factual area. B. SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTONAL LAW
§ 139 (1973). In some areas of commercial regulation the commercial speech doctrine has not
been generally applied, rather the courts have traditionally spoken only in terms of due
process standards. This tendency seems to have resulted in the relegation of the doctrine to
a certain degree of obscurity. See generally Note, Freedom of Expression In A Commercial
Context, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1191 (1965).
20. Kaufman, The Medium, the Message and the First Amendment, 45 N.Y.U.L. REV. 761,
769 (1970).
21. See, e.g., Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959) (Douglas, J., concur-
ring); See 1 C. ANTIEAU, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 1:3 (1969); Redish, The First Amend-
ment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 429 (1971); Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 1005 (1967); Comment, The First Amendment and Consumer Protection: Commercial
Advertising as Protected Speech, 50 ORE. L. REV. 177 (1971); 5 U. CHI. L. REV. 675 (1938)
(arguing against a commercial distinction before Valentine).
22. Redish, supra note 21, at 429. Some of the theories which have presented themselves
over this past half-century include: "clear and present danger test" enunciated in Schenck
v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); two levels of language theory (protected and not pro-
tected) stated in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); the balancing of inter-
ests formula seemingly announced in the American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S.
382 (1950); in the realm of obscenity the social value test announced in Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476 (1957) and seemingly exploded in the recent decision of Miller v. California, 93
S. Ct. 2607 (1973) leaving the definition of obscenity to the individual localities. See generally
Kalvern, The New York Times Case: A Note on "the Central Meaning of the First Amend-
ment," 1964 S. CT. REV. 191.
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Pittsburgh Press completely devoid of any theoretical foundation? An
-analysis of the majority's opinion suggests that it is not. The Court in
Pittsburgh Press put down its first and essential premise to the opinion:
the purpose of the first amendment and its protection of the press is to
preserve our system of self-government.? This premise was not merely
accident of introduction, nor was it uttered in a hushed tone. This state-
ment of the first amendment as an exponential function of "democracy"
and "self-government" demonstrates the culmination of a half-century of
judicial thought 4 which has found firmament in the more recent first
amendment decisions.?
This new first amendment philosophy is essentially the statement of a
theory long espoused by the late Professor Alexander Meiklejohn. 26 As the
premise laid by the Court in Pittsburgh Press suggests, this theory might
best be called the self-government principle. Briefly stated, the principle
holds that wherever there is language which either has direct relevance to
self-governing decisions a citizen must make or which in some way adds
to his education and enlightenment so as to better prepare him to make
these decisions, then this language is "free speech" absolutely protected
by the first amendment .2  Any other speech would presumably be
protected only by due process standards.2 8
When one views the fact that in Pittsburgh Press one of the dissenting
judges himself cited Professor Meiklejohn, 29 it becomes apparent that the
real question in this case was whether "purely commercial speech" as a
classification should be excluded in a blanket fashion as not of self-
governing significance or should such language receive consideration under
the self-government principle on a case to case basis. Apparently the ma-
jority felt that it had no such significance, but this result must be tempered
23. In the words of the Court itself:
As Mr. Justice Black put it, "In the First Amendment the Founding Forefathers gave
the free press the protection it must have to fulfill its essential role in our democracy."
... [O]ur system of self-government hinges upon the preservation of these free-
doms .... The repeated emphasis accorded this theme in the decisions of this Court
serves to underline the narrowness of the recognized exceptions to the principle that
the press may not be regulated by the Government. [emphasis added]. 93 S. Ct. at
2557.
24. See note 23 supra.
25. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374
(1967); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S.130 (1967); Brennan, The Supreme Court and
the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HAiv. L. REv. 1 (1965); Kalvern,
supra note 22.
26. See Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245.
27. Id.
28. Redish, supra note 21, at 429.
29. 93 S. Ct. at 2564 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
1974]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
by the fact that the Court was dealing with illegal discriminatory employ-
ment practices." Had it confronted the self-government principle in more
neutral territory the commercial speech doctrine might not have gone un-
scathed as it did in Pittsburgh Press.
For those who feel that the best, if not the only way to protect our
fundamental rights to freedom of speech and press is to provide total
protection to all language, the continuation of the commercial speech doc-
trine will be greeted as an anathema. Pittsburgh Press offers no support
for the absolutist philosophy. For those who believe the theory that first
amendment protection is a function of the particular media involved3 ' and
that newspaper and their kindred are particularly sacred media,
Pittsburgh Press will represent yet another encroachment upon editorial
freedom by government.
Should newspapers be protected by the first amendment in their indis-
criminate publishing of improperly sex-designated employment advertise-
ments? Is purely commercial speech unprotected by the first amendment?
Looking at the degree of regulation over commercial speech which is now
exercised by federal agencies alone,32 one wonders if it is even feasible to
speak of purely commercial language as being absolutely protected by the
Constitution. It would seem that the right to "propose commercial transac-
tions" is something more akin to a property right33 protected by due process
standards rather than "free speech" in the first amendment sense of the
term. The sheer realities of our present form of government would seem to
suggest that the self-government principle never has nor ever will include
purely commercial speech."
G.L.R.
30. It seems that the case could have been decided based upon this matter of illegality
alone. While there have been few audacious enough to, argue the point, it is clear that
language used to actually carry out an illegal activity is unprotected by the first amendment.
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652
(1925); Gompers v. Bucks Stove and Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911).
31. See generally Kaufman, supra note 20; 51 N.C.L. REv. 581 (1973).
32. Consider, e.g., the regulation of commercial language by agencies such as the FTC,
SEC, and FDA.
33. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YAL L.J. 877, 948 n.93
(1963).
34. The reasons for this conclusion were best expressed in the dissenting opinion of Judge
Frank in Chrestensen v. Valentine, 122 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1941), rev'd 316 U.S. 52 (1942):
[sluch men as Thomas Paine, John Milton, and Thomas Jefferson were not fighting
for the right to peddle commercial advertising .... [N]o business man need apolo-
gize for seeking personal gain .... But the constitutional limitations on legislation
affecting such pursuits are not as specific and exacting as those imposed on legislation
interfering with free speech. Id. at 524.
Judge Frank's words were ultimately vindicated by the Supreme Court when the commercial
speech doctrine was first announced in Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
[Vol. 8:292
